Abstract: This DataWatch describes the process adopted by The Health Insurance Plan of California (The HIPC) for assessing and adjusting for health risk differences among participating health plans. We also report on the results of the 1996 risk assessment/ adjustment calculations. A risk assessment value is calculated for each health plan based on the plan's enrollee mix as compared with the mix of enrollees in The HIPC as a whole. The results indicate that approximately 1 percent of total premium dollars needs to be transferred to bring all health plan scores within the acceptable level (± 5 percent) of risk distribution.
M
uch of the recent progress in health system reform has been related t o underwriting reforms, the basic intent of which is to restrict health plans' ability to segment risk in the market and to force plans to compete on price, service, and quality. In 1993 California embraced a broad range of underwriting reforms in the small-group insurance market. The reform package also included authorization for a voluntary statewide purchasing cooperative designed to garner the benefits of large-group purchasing for small employer groups. The legislation allowed but did not mandate use of a prospective risk adjustment process to minimize differences in the actuarial risk of the health plans participating in the cooperative. The underwriting reforms and the purchasing cooperative, knawn as The Health Insurance Plan of California (The HIPC), have been operative since July 1993. As of 1 January 1996, 5,529 employer groups encompassing 101,230 enrollees had enrolled in one or more of The HIPC's twenty-four participating health plans.
The structure of The HIPC provides basic protection against risk segmentation by health plans. These structural features include the marketwide reform components mentioned above, the use of a standard benefit design, and annual open enrollment periods in which subscribers may change health plans. However, health plans' ability to segment risk has not been eliminated. Some of the ways in which risk can continue to be segmented include design of provider networks, slow referral to specialty care, encouragement from case management or customer service staff that another health plan may be "better able to meet a customer's needs," or marketing techniques that technically conform to the fair marketing laws but are designed to discourage higher-risk subscribers from enrolling. It is also possible that persons with high-cost illnesses will by chance or by personal preference be concentrated in a few health plans.
Two aspects of The HIPC may increase health plans' ability to engage in risk segmentation. First, workers in employer groups joining The HIPC choose their preferred health plan each year. Individual choice is likely to exacerbate any nonrandom risk segmentation that is occurring. Second, the pressure from organized health care buyers on health plans to reduce price may increase the incentive for plans to engage in risk-segmenting behavior to satisfy purchasers' pricing demands.
The HIPC's governing entity, the California Managed Risk Medical Insurance Board (MRMIB) a voluntary, semi-independent state board), ( instructed staff to work with the health plans participating in The HIPC and the board's consultants at Coopers and Lybrand to develop a prospective method to measure and adjust for risk-based differences in health plan enrollment. The board asked staff to develop a method that was acceptable to the health plans participating in The HIPC, reflected state-of-the-art methods for measuring risk, and was feasible to implement given the wide range of the health plans' ability to collect data.
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This DataWatch describes the process adopted by The HIPC for assessing and adjusting for health-risk differences in membership between participating health plans and reports the results of the first risk assessment/ adjustment calculations. The first risk adjustment transfers between health plans will be made 1 July 1996. Each subsequent July the transfer amounts will be updated to reflect the most recent risk assessment calculation.
A series of work group meetings reviewed possible approaches to risk assessment and risk adjustment. From the available options, including expanded use of demographic characteristics, prior use of health services, self-reported health status measures, and use of key diagnostic indicators, the work group agreed to pursue an approach based on sex, key diagnostic indicators, and the number of children per contract. These risk indicators were chosen because the work group believed that they represent the key cost characteristics that are not permitted as rating factors in The HIPC. Marker diagnoses were considered by work group members to be the most important indicator of likely differences in risk.
The process is intended to minimize any financial incentives health plans may have to select healthier-than-average members. Expected results of the process are to deter plans from selecting or marketing to healthier members, to protect those health plans that are selected by a costlier/ less healthy group of members, and to encourage health plans' efforts to achieve excellence in treating people with high-cost conditions. It is not a goal of the process to standardize the premiums charged by all health plans for subscribers with comparable risk characteristics. Only those differences that are attributable to variations in the level of risk across health plans that are not accounted for in the premium rates are targeted.
Overview Of The Risk Assessment/ Adjustment Process
A risk assessment value (RAV) is calculated for each health plan based on the health plan's enrollee mix as compared with the enrollee mix of The HIPC as a whole. These values are based on three components: sex, diagnosis, and the number of children per contract. Premium rates charged to HIPC participants vary based on age, geographic region, and family size. No differences in premiums are permitted based on an enrollee's sex or health status.
The RAV of The HIPC as a whole is always 1.0. The distribution of each health plan's RAV will determine whether or not the risk adjustment process is engaged. If all health plans have values within a predetermined threshold of acceptable risk distribution (±5 percent), no risk adjustment is necessary.
Health plans that exceed the threshold are considered "outlier" health plans. The presence of outlier health plans triggers the risk adjustment process. Risk adjustment is done when at least one health plan has a RAV that is at least 5 percent different from The HIPC as a whole (a value that is less than 0.95 or greater than 1.05). Exhibit 1 illustrates the annual risk assessment/ adjustment process.
Measuring Risk Differences Among Health Plans
Marker diagnoses. The most challenging of the RAV calculations is measuring differences among health plans in the proportion of HIPC members with "marker" diagnoses. A list of 120 marker diagnoses is used in making the calculation; the most common marker diagnoses and their relative values are shown in Exhibit 2.
The list of marker diagnoses was created through an iterative process using data supplied by health plans participating in The HIPC. Data were solicited from all HIPC health plans. Four HIPC health plans-Aetna's preferred provider organization (PPO); Employers Health Insurance; John Alden; and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Northern California Region- provided data for use in the analysis. The data supplied by Kaiser represent 6.5 million person years of coverage (1992) (1993) (1994) ; the combined data from the other three health plans total 595,000 person years (1992) (1993) . All data were for the health plans' California commercial members.
Diagnoses considered for the analysis were restricted to those that have higher-than-average costs (using a variety of cost thresholds), are reasonably predictable, and are subject to a limited degree of coding discretion. Also, certain types of cases, including normal maternity, mental health and chemical dependency, and trauma, were excluded from the analysis. The marker diagnoses contained on the final list are those International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes that are associated with an inpatient stay and have average annual health care charges of $15,000 or more. The use of an inpatient day "trigger" for identification of persons with marker diagnoses was the result of the inability of many health plans to accurately track or value in a common way the occurrence or cost of the ambulatory services provided to their members.
The relative weight for each marker diagnosis was calculated by dividing the average charges for each person with a marker diagnosis by the average charges for all other persons in the database.
To determine each health plan's marker diagnosis score, a composite marker diagnosis weight is calculated based on the proportion of HIPC members in each health plan that have marker diagnoses and the risk weight for the diagnoses. An average risk weight for all other plan members also is calculated so that the overall average for the entire HIPC population has a risk weight of 1.0. Each plan's proportion of marker diagnoses is compared with the proportion of persons with marker diagnoses in The HIPC as a whole. Data used for calculation of the marker diagnosis score are based on HIPC members' utilization data from the prior benefit year.
Process for collecting and counting marker diagnosis data. Each health plan must provide documentation of the presence of HIPC members who meet the criteria for marker diagnoses. A powerful incentive is provided to plans to report marker diagnoses. Plans that do not report any HIPC members with marker diagnoses are assumed not to have any. As a result, these plans have a lower average risk weight, as all of their members are assumed to have the weight of the "other" population.
3 To assure that all plans are using consistent criteria for identifying members with marker diagnoses, the MRMIB audits all of the marker diagnosis data.
The marker diagnosis scores are adjusted for the age of persons enrolled in each health plan. This is done because health plans can price for age differences and because the probability of having certain of the marker diagnoses is related to age.
Weighting factors. Each health plan's scores for mix of enrollees' sex and number of children per contract are calculated by comparing the mix in the health plan with the mix in The HIPC as a whole. Data used for both calculations are obtained from The HIPC's enrollment database and are based on a "snapshot" of HIPC enrollment on the risk assessment calculation date (1 November).
The weighting factors for the sex mix are stratified by age. This approach is needed because there are significant differences in sex weighting for the various age categories. For example, typical actuarial tables for males and females show that average costs for females are twice as high as those for males during the childbearing years. As the population ages, males generally are shown to incur higher levels of health care costs. The sex weighting factors were calculated using 1991 data from Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Northern California Region.
Differences in family size among health plans are measured by comparing the number of children per contract in each health plan with the number of children per contract in The HIPC as a whole. This factor measures the number of children in the two premium-rating categories that include children and calculates the expected difference in total cost per contract associated with differences in family size. This calculation is done to account for the fact that California's small-group market rating laws restrict family-size rating to four categories and thus do not permit health plans to price for the cost impact of families with a large number of children. The relative cost per child used in the analysis is based on 1991 data for the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Northern California Region, and is calculated as 62 percent of the cost of an adult. 
Correcting For Risk Maldistribution
Distribution of risk among health plans. A RAV for each health plan is calculated by multiplying each health plan's sex mix score by its familysize mix score and by its diagnosis mix score. If necessary, the total weight for all health plans is "normalized" to 1.0. To address concerns regarding the credibility of the scores for those health plans with very small HIPC enrollment, the RAVs of plans with fewer than 1,000 HIPC members on the risk assessment analysis date are adjusted. A formula is used that creates a blended score with varying weight given to the plan's score and The HIPC's average score.
4 Exhibit 3 displays the results for the 1995 risk assessment calculation. One plan had a RAV above the 1.05 threshold, and two plans had RAVs below the 0.95 threshold.
The goal of the risk adjustment process is to adjust the RAV of any and all outlier health plans to the ±5 percent threshold level.
5 Once the risk adjustment process is activated (by the presence of an outlier health plan), the process is iterative and may involve all participating health planseven those with initial risk assessment scores that are within the threshold amounts.
The results of each year's risk assessment process are available to health plans during The HIPC's annual rate negotiation cycle so that participating plans can factor risk adjustment transfer amounts (payments or receipts) into their prospective rate setting. Risk adjustment transfer amounts apply to HIPC premiums throughout the subsequent benefit year. 6 Before transfer amounts are calculated, two additional calculations are made.
Accounting for allowable pricing factors. Risk adjustment transfer amounts must take into account the factors for which health plans are able to price in their monthly HIPC premiums so that risk differences already incorporated into premium rates are not incorrectly included in the risk adjustment transfer amounts. To remove these effects, a factor that measures each health plan's age, geographic region, and family-size mix against The HIPC average is calculated. The result of this calculation is called the health plan's rated risk factor.
Calculating a theoretical average monthly premium. A reference point is needed for calculating the risk adjustment transfer amounts; for this, a theoretical average monthly premium is used. The theoretical average monthly premium is calculated by multiplying each health plan's rated risk factor by the overall average HIPC premium. This calculation adjusts the average HIPC premium by those risk factors that health plans are able to include in their HIPC rates.
Risk adjustment transfer payment/ receipt calculation. The first step in the risk adjustment process is to calculate the amount of funds needed to move the high-and low-end outlier health plans to the risk threshold, The total amount is considered the risk transfer pool. Each health plan's effective RAV is then recalculated based on the amount of dollars transferred. The outlier health plans are assigned a RAV of either the high-or the low-end threshold; that is, high-end outliers are assigned a value of 1.05, and low-end outliers are assigned a value of 0.95. The factors for all of the health plans are then recalculated based on the percentage of the theoretical average premium collected by each health plan. If the risk transfer pool has insufficient funds to move the high-end outliers to the risk threshold, additional funds are collected from the lowest-risk plans until the risk transfer pool is fully funded, or until the "effective" risk factor for the lowest-risk plan has moved up to the nextlowest-ranked plan. This step is repeated until the risk transfer pool has a zero balance.
Summary of risk adjustment results. The results of The HIPC's 1995 risk assessment/ adjustment process indicate that just over 1 percent of total premium dollars needs to be transferred to bring all plans' risk assessment values within the thresholds (Exhibit 4). The individual plan assessments include payments from seven health plans, all health maintenance organizations (HMOs), ranging from $0.69 to $11.80 per contract per month. The one high-end outlier plan, a PPO, receives $46.04 per contract per month. Sixteen health plans (one PPO and fifteen HMOs) are not affected by the risk adjustment process.
D i sc u s si o n
The HIPC's risk assessment/ adjustment process was developed by a working group that invited the input of all participating health plans. Two simulations of the model were performed prior to implementation, to test its stability. The model is based on measuring differences in risk mix and not differences in efficiency among the health plans. However, some observers note with dismay the position of a PPO as the only receiver planthat is, the only health plan that will receive risk adjustment transfer payments. We believe that this is attributable to the concentration of higher-risk persons in the PPO. An in-depth look at the component scores in the risk assessment reveals why this is so. Excluding the values for the plans with HIPC enrollment of less than 1,000, the receiver plan had the overall highest diagnosis and second-highest sex-factor scores.
Other observers question whether the method is anticompetitive and rewards inefficient delivery systems. We do not believe this is so. The entire process is designed to shift health plan competition from risk segmentation to competition based on quality, cost, and service. Risk is measured based on an assessment of the underlying demographic and health status of members, not on the cost to any specific HIPC health plan to treat their conditions. In our simulations and first year of implementation, we found that the ability of health plans to report and provide documentation of members with marker diagnoses varied widely. Systems that track and link cost, utilization, and diagnostic data are likely to continue to be a competitive distinction between health plans.
Although the method measures the distribution of risk, it does not answer the question of why risk is concentrated in one plan over another. If alternative delivery systems are to compete in an individual-choice model, 
